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I. Introduction
Seller sells a shipment to distributor. Distributor sells a
portion of that shipment to retailer. And, retailer then sells the
product to the ultimate consumer. An all-too-common occurrence
duplicated across countries and industries. But, what if that
product was defective and the retailer could not sell the product, or
must sell it for substantially less? What if the retailer (for a
variety of reasons) wants to directly sue the upstream seller? And
now, what if this was an international commercial sales
transaction?
Typically, the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (CISG) governs international
commercial sale of goods transactions.' And traditionally,
scholars, national courts, and arbitral tribunals have interpreted the
CISG narrowly to require privity2 between the parties for an action
to proceed under the CISG.3 But, given the erosion of the privity
I United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG].
2 The privity requirement, succinctly put, requires that "[t]he contracting parties
are the sole parties able to claim damages on the basis of the contract." Riku Korpela,
Article 74 of the United States Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, in REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GoODS (CISG) 2004-2005 73, 88 (Pace Int'l L. Rev. ed., Eur. L. Publishers 2006).
3 See, e.g., Caterpillar, Inc. v. Usinor Industeel, 393 F. Supp. 2d 659, 674 (N.D.
Ill. 2005) ("The plain text of the CISG limits its application to claims between buyers
and sellers."); Henry Mather, Choice ofLaw for International Sales Issues Not Resolved
by the CISG, 20 J.L. & COM. 155, 159 (2001) (arguing the language of the CISG
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requirement across the international sales community, the text of
the CISG, and the CISG's interpretive article, a more compelling
argument exists that a direct action against these upstream sellerss
is already within the CISG's text.6
Scholars, national courts, and arbitral tribunals skirt the privity
issue, deciding instead to find a host of ways up, around, over, and
under this supposed privity barrier.' These scholars, courts, and
tribunals have fought hard to offer a remedy to the aggrieved
downstream party while assuming, without any discussion, that
privity operates as a barrier to a direct action.' Simply put, this
exercise is unnecessary and does not comport with the text, the
international trend towards eroding the requirement of strict
expressly covers only two parties: one buyer and one seller); Richard Speidel, The
Revision of UCC Article 2, Sales in Light of the United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods, 16 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 165, 173 (1995) ("CISG is
not concerned with ... the rights of third persons who are not parties to the contract ...
CISG is limited to two-party commercial contracts for sale."); Ingeborg Schwenzer &
Mareike Schmidt, Extending the CISG to Non-Privity Parties, 13 VINDOBONA J. INT'L
COM. L. & ARB. 109, 114-16 (2009) (asserting the CISG is concerned with two-party
contracts, and arguing for non-CISG approaches to third-party liability); Korpela, supra
note 2, at 91.
4 CISG, supra note 1, art. 7.
5 Use of the term upstream seller here and throughout this Article is purposeful.
The common term remote manufacturer/seller, while frequently utilized, is a misnomer.
Often, these manufacturers and sellers are not remote at all-they engage in direct
advertising and marketing and other varying levels of control over the downstream
process. See generally JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES
UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 63-65 (3d ed., 1999) [hereinafter
HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW] (noting that some foreign manufacturers' places of business
may be located in the same state as the seller).
6 See id. at 65 (asserting it would be "hasty to conclude that the 'buyer-seller'
language of Article 4 will be an impassable barrier in cases where the supplier has
participated substantially (although not formally) in the sale to the buyer"); see also
Antonin I. Pribetic, A New Canadian CISG Case, (Not), THE TRIAL WARRIOR BLOG (Jan.
18, 2011, 1:44 PM), http://thetrialwarrior.com/2011/01/18/a-new-canadian-cisg-case-not/
("[T]he issue of imposing liability on non-privities under the CISG is not settled.").
7 See infra Part 111.
8 See Schwenzer & Schmidt, supra note 3, at 113-16 ("[f]t is first necessary to
consider whether the CISG deals with the question of the admissibility of contractual
claims without privity of contract."). Schwenzer and Schmidt fail to discuss the
possibility that the CISG already provides for third-party contractual liability. Instead,
they skip this discussion in favor of a plethora of non-CISG remedies possibly
appropriate for some third-parties. See id. at 113-15.
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privity, or the CISG's interpretive commands.' A solution exists
within the CISG's seller language to accomplish the same remedy
without the multitude of inconsistently applied national remedies
all reaching the same result: upstream sellers are liable for their
harms.o
II. The Erosion of Privity
If one were to recount the history of the requirement of privity
of contract, the plot would be drawn-out and constantly shifting.
Despite the long legal history of the requirement of privity to
enforce contractual obligations, many jurisdictions across the
planet have slowly adapted to a changing world by altering the
doctrine." To address the current misapplication of privity to the
CISG, it is necessary to first trace the history of the strict privity of
contract doctrine from its modem origins in English common law,
and then address the criticism that the requirement has received
from judicial reformists, scholars, judges, and even nations as a
whole.
The indefinite history of the strict requirement of privily of
contract in the common law of England became definite in the
mid-nineteenth century when the case of Tweddle v. Atkinson, 2
decided by the Court of the Queen's Bench, embedded the
doctrine in English law for over a century.13 The concept of
"privily of contract" is extremely simple: "The relationship
between the parties to a contract, allowing them to sue each other
9 See generally Donald J. Smythe, The Road to Nowhere: Caterpillar v. Usinor
and CISG Claims by Downstream Buyers Against Remote Sellers, 2 GEO. MASON J.
INT'L & COM. L. 123, 150 (2011) ("If Article 4 of the CISG is defined narrowly, so as to
require privity for CISG claims, then international sales law will remain underdeveloped
and ill-suited to address contracting problems in the modem commercial world.").
10 See infra Part IV.
II See Schwenzer & Schmidt, supra note 3, at 109. The idea that nearly every
nation has developed its own particularities up, around, over, and under the privity
barrier is hardly controversial. See id. at 110 ("In all legal systems, the sanctity of
privity of contract has nowadays been attenuated and possibilities exist to extend
contractual claims to persons who are not a party to the original contract.").
12 Tweddle v. Atkinson, (1861) 121 Eng. Rep. 762 (Q.B.) 764.
13 Rizvan Khawar, Reinsurance and Privity in the Past, Present, and Future:
Privity of Contract in Reinsurance and the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999,
77 TUL. L. REV. 495, 499 (2002).
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but preventing a third party from doing so."' 4 This doctrine, as
applied to commercial transactions, effectively operates to limit
the liability of upstream sellers to downstream purchasers.'" This
doctrine of English common law was pivotal in the development
of legal systems worldwide.16
In England, where the modem requirement of strict privity first
blossomed, the doctrine remained rigorously in effect until the
passage of the Contracts Act of 1999, which "allow[ed] a third
party to enforce contracts that expressly provide for enforcement
by a third party . .. [and] provide[d] for the enforcement of
contracts whose terms purport to confer a benefit upon a third
party."l7 The United Kingdom, however, was not the first to act in
adapting its contract law to the demands of the modem global
economy and era.
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and the
CISG are similar in a fundamental way: both sought to develop
uniformity in the sale of goods and attempted to reflect modem
commercial practice at the time they were adopted.'" The National
Conference of Commissioners for Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL)
and the American Law Institute (ALI) develop the UCC.19 Neither
of these organizations actually has the power to create law;
therefore, the UCC is ratified on a state by state basis. 20 Every
14 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1320 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "privity of contract");
see also id. (defining "privity" as "[t]he connection or relationship between two parties,
each having a legally recognized interest in the same subject matter."); Korpela, supra
note 2, at 88 ("The contracting parties are the sole parties able to claim damages on the
basis of the contract.").
15 See Korpela, supra note 2, at 89.
16 See generally Smythe, supra note 9, at 134-35 (citing Francis Dawson, New
Zealand Privity of Contract Bill, 2 O.J.L.S. 448, 451, 453 (1982)); Michael Trebilcock,
The Doctrine of Privity of Contract: Judicial Activism in the Supreme Court of Canada,
57 U. TORONTO L.J. 269 (2007) (noting that many other countries have what amount to
privity requirements).
17 Khawar, supra note 13, at 499; see Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act,
1999, c. 31 (Eng.).
18 U.C.C. § 1-103 (1977) (stating that a purpose of the UCC is "mak[ing] uniform
the law among the various jurisdictions"); Smythe, supra note 9, at 124 (explaining the
CISG's purpose as creating a uniform system governing international sales of goods).
19 See Projects, AM. L. INST., http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=
about.instituteprojects (last visited Jan. 16, 2013).
20 See Jeffrey M. Dressler, Good Faith Rejection of Goods in a Falling Market, 42
CONN. L. REv. 611, 622 (2009).
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state besides Louisiana has adopted the UCC, or something akin
thereto.2 ' The NCCUSL and the ALI revised Article 2 in 1999 and
2003; however, the 2003 revisions were withdrawn as it became
clear that no states would adopt the revised code.22 Importantly,
the 1999 revisions to Article 2, which were the first of their kind
since it was published in 1952,23 are pivotal to understanding the
adaptation of contract law to meet the needs of modem times.
Long before states began to adopt the revisions to Article 2,
courts understood the need for relief from strict privity and found
ways to afford protection to non-contracting parties.24 Eventually,
legislators followed suit by adopting the revised Article 2, which
included new provisions loosening the requirement of privity in
breach of warranty claims, allowing claims from downstream
buyers and non-buyers.25 As Professor Donald Smythe explains,
"the modem trend in both American and foreign law has been
towards the elimination or diminishment of the privity
requirement." 26 Scholars consider the requirement "a vestige of an
outmoded, narrowly doctrinal conception of contracts."2 7
Similarly, the United States is further representative of the
international erosion of this ancient, inconsistently applied
21 Anelize Slomp Aguiar, The Law Applicable to International Trade Transactions
with Brazilian Parties: A Comparative Study of the Brazilian Law, the CISG, and the
American Law About Contract Formation, 17 LAW & Bus. REv. AM. 487, 534 n.285
(2011) ("In 1974, the state of Louisiana adopted other parts of the UCC, but not Article
2, preferring to maintain its own civil law tradition on this issue.").
22 See Permanent Editorial Board for the UCC, AM. L. INST., http://www.ali.org/
index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.projip&projectid-4 (last visited Jan. 13, 2013).
23 See Hannu Honka, Harmonization of Contract Law Through International
Trade: A Nordic Perspective, 11 TUL. EUR. & Civ. L.F. I11, 157 (1996).
24 See Yates v. Pitman Mfg., Inc., 514 S.E.2d 605, 607-08 (Va. 1999) (finding, in a
warranty context, that express contractual language was an "affirmation of fact," thus
evading the privity barrier).
25 See U.C.C. §§ 2-408, 2-409 (1999).
26 Smythe, supra note 9, at 143; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note
14, at 1320 ("The requirement of privity has been relaxed under modem laws and
doctrines of implied warranty and strict liability, which allow a third-party beneficiary or
other foreseeable user to sue the seller of a defective product.").
27 Smythe, supra note 9, at 139; see also WILLIAM R. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF CONTRACT 335 (Arthur L. Corbin ed., 3d Am. ed. 1919) ("To many students and
practitioners of the common law privity of contract became a fetish. As such, it operated
to deprive many a claimant of a remedy in cases where according to the mores of the
time the claim was just.").
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requirement. 28 Before direct action (in the consumer arena), U.S.
parties used the theory of negligence to subvert the privity barrier
to suit without being a signatory to the direct contract.29  Then
came the idea of res ipsa loquitor ("the thing speaks for itself') to
allow suit in lieu of a direct contract.3 0 Then, contract warranties
that extended to consumers were outside the scope of the direct
contract.3 ' Next came market share and enterprise liability:
essentially, if you profit from the sale, why should you not be held
liable for your portion of the problems with that sale, regardless of
a direct contract with the aggrieved party? 3 2  Finally, today,
complete privity is not required and a direct action exists from
consumer to upstream seller.33
This change is representative of the international community,
where downstream sellers typically seek indemnity from upstream
sellers based on an implied warranty.34 Or, by placing the goods
on the market, upstream sellers expressly or impliedly represent
that the goods are suitable and stand behind the goods.3 ' The
French use this concept in their action directe, and similar laws
exist in Belgium and Luxembourg.3 6
28 See Smythe, supra note 9, at 140 n.74 (citing Sjajna v. Gen. Motors Corp., 503
N.E.2d 760 (111. 1986)) ("In practice, privity of contract exists wherever courts say it
exists.").
29 See, e.g., Macpherson v. Buick Motor Co., Ill N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916); JAMES J.
WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: SALES 390 (Hombook
Series 4th ed.).
30 See generally WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 29, at 390; WILLIAM LLOYD
PROSSER, TORTS § 96 (3d ed. 1964) (discussing the causation requirement and suggesting
that the injured party may rely on res ipsa loquitur).
31 See U.C.C. § 2-318 (presenting three alternative approaches).
32 See generally Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936-37 (Cal. 1980)
(discussing market share liability without a direct contract); Hall v. E. 1. Du Pont De
Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 372 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (discussing enterprise liability
without a direct contract).
33 See generally Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-12 (2006)
(governing warranties on consumer products transactions promoting enforceability and
consumer protection principles).
34 See Comment, Manufacturers Liability to Remote Purchasers for "Economic
Loss" Damages-Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 539, 539 (1966) [hereinafter
Manufactures Liability]; LouIS R. FRUMER & MELVIN 1. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 4.04 (Matthew Bender Release No. 121, Sept. 2012); PROSSER, supra note 30, § 97.
35 See Manufacturers Liability, supra note 34, at 539-40.
36 Schwenzer & Schmidt, supra note 3, at 113 (citing Nicholas Carette, Direct
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Rather than accept the unending struggle of different avenues
to recover the same amount for the same harm from the same
upstream seller, there was always a push to streamline this
process, resulting in the direct action.3 7 Despite this erosion-and
many more national shifts38 up, around, over, and under the
doctrine of strict privity-scholars and courts unnecessarily
continue to interpret the CISG's buyer and seller language as a
requirement of strict privity.3 9
III. Up, Around, Over, and Under
The CISG states, "This Convention governs only the formation
of the contract of sale and the rights and obligations of the seller
and the buyer arising from such a contract.' Based on this buyer
and seller language of Article 4, most scholars and courts have
found an express requirement of privity of contract, as if Article 4
actually read, "This Convention governs only the formation of the
contract of sale and the rights and obligations of the [immediate]
seller and the [immediate] buyer arising from such a contract.'
These same commentators seemingly consider the inclusion of the
Contractual Claims of the Sub-buyer and International Sale of Goods: Applicable Law
and Applicability of the CISG, 4 EUR. REV. OF PRIVATE L. 583, 586ff (2008)); see also
MARTIN KOHLER, DIE HAFTUNG NACH UN KAUFRECHT IM SPANNUNGSVERHALTNIS
ZWISCHEN VERTRAG UND DELIKT, 167 n.151 (Tubingen, Mohr Siebeck 2003); Smythe,
supra note 9, at 143 (explaining the "modern trend in both American and foreign law"
has been to relax the privity requirement).
37 See Smythe, supra note 9, at 139.
38 Schwenzer & Schmidt, supra note 3, at 112 ("Both Germanic and U.S.-
American case law shows that from the beginnings of this development not only
consumers but often also commercial buyers were able to claim damages for their
commercial losses based on the concepts of manufacturers' guarantees or express
warranties.") (citing, for example, Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice]
June 24, 1981, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2248, 1981 (Ger.); Randy
Knitwear, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 181 N.E.2d 399, 403 (N.Y. 1962); Klein v.
Asgrow Seed Co., 54 Cal. Rptr. 609 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); B.B.P. Ass'n v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 420 P.2d 134, 138-39 (Idaho 1966)); see also P.S. ATIYAH, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 265 (3d ed. 1981) ("[T]here has been a
constant tendency for contractual rights to be extended in their scope so as to affect more
and more persons who cannot be regarded as parties to the transaction.").
39 See, e.g., Caterpillar, Inc. v. Usinor Industeel, 393 F. Supp. 2d 659, 674 (N.D.
Ill. 2005).
40 CISG, supra note 1, art. 4.
41 Id
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article "the" within the language of Article 4 to mandate privity.
Since courts have almost uniformly adopted this weak posture,
those who realize that a CISG that requires strict privity of
contract is simply outdated and obsolete in modem times42 attempt
to seek ways around the requirement. Namely, these same
scholars jump to national law resolutions to hold upstream
manufacturers liable or try to subvert an apparent privity
requirement through alternative CISG articles.43
A. National Law Subversion
Unfortunately, despite the multitude of signatory nations,4 the
CISG's express thirst for developing a standard and uniformly
applied code for international commercial sales transactions
remains unquenched. This unfortunate result stems not from a
weakness in drafting or international support, but rather a
weakness in application. This weakness in application may be the
product of a lack of an international system of precedent, a
"homeward trend" bias demonstrated by many national courts,45 or
a variety of other reasons. Whatever the reason, however, it is
clear that courts often use alternate domestic laws in order to avoid
42 See Smythe, supra note 9, at 139-43.
43 See infra Part III.A, C.
44 Status 1980 - United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods, UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/sale goods/ 980CISG status.html
(last visited Jan. 13, 2013) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Status] (showing that, as of
February 24, 2012, seventy-eight nations have adopted the CISG).
45 CISG commentary often references said "homeward trend" bias. See, e.g.,
Smythe, supra note 9, at 131; see also LARRY DIMATEO ET AL., INTERNATIONAL SALES
LAW: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CISG JURISPRUDENCE 2-3 (2005); JOHN 0. HONNOLD,
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE STUDIES,
DELIBERATIONS, AND DECISIONS THAT LED TO THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
WITH INTRODUCTIONS AND EXPLANATIONS 1 (1989); Harry M. Flechtner, The Several
Texts of the CISG in a Decentralized System: Observations on Translations,
Reservations and Other Challenges to the Uniformity Principle in Article 7(1), 17 J.L. &
CoM. 187, 200-04 (1998); United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL), Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods 17, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/5 (Mar. 14, 1979), available at
http://www.globalsaleslaw.org/index.cfn?pagelD=644 ("[I]t is especially important to
avoid differing constructions of the provisions of this Convention by national courts,
each dependent upon the concepts used in the legal system of the country of the
forum.").
2013 705
N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.
applying the CISG.46 In doing so, courts undermine the CISG's
legitimacy, leaving the same void in international commercial
sales transactions that the CISG and its signatory nations aimed to
fill. 47
National courts often avoid applying the CISG when faced
with an international commercial sales transaction gone awry by
quickly finding that "[t]he plain text of the CISG limits its
application to claims between buyers and sellers," thereby
requiring strict privity of contract.48 This is a significant problem,
as it severely limits the CISG's application in the modern world of
international commercial sales. How often does an ultimate
commercial purchaser actually purchase from the initial upstream
seller itself? The answer to this question hardly requires any
support or elaborate commentary. Therefore, in a world where the
CISG is limited to parties standing in strict privity of contract, and
where the ultimate commercial purchaser buys from an
intermediary and not the initial upstream seller, the practice
renders the CISG essentially obsolete in application.49
In finding that the CISG requires strict privity of contract,
courts fail to realize that, at most, the text is silent regarding
claims against upstream sellers, and international law
commentators are quick to adopt this view.so However, the CISG
text expressly allows such claims despite the lack of attention to
this point by commentators.5 Just as when courts and legislatures
across the United States began creating loopholes to avoid the
strict privity requirement imposed by the 1956 version of the
UCC, and when other nations did the same with their domestic
46 See, e.g., Smythe, supra note 9, at 131 n.39 (providing a myriad of sources
documenting the homeward trend bias).
47 See Smythe, supra note 9, at 131-34. The Pace Institute of International
Commercial Law reports that only 158 CISG proceedings, both court and arbitral, have
taken place in the United States. See CISG Database Country Case Schedule, PACE
INST. INT'L COMM. L., http://www.cisg.law.pace.edulcisg/text/casecit.html (last visited
Jan. 16, 2013).
48 Caterpillar, Inc. v. Usinor Industeel, 393 F. Supp. 2d 659, 674 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
49 See Schwenzer & Schmidt, supra note 3, at 109-10 ("The developments of
recent years-especially due to globalisation of trade-have made chains of contracts an
important focus for consideration.").
5 See id. at 115; Smythe, supra note 9, at 129.
51 See infra Part IV.
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laws,52 CISG scholars periodically proposed ways around this
presumed strict privity requirement or presumed silence on
privity. 3 Since commentators and courts broaching the topic have
presumed that the CISG either requires strict privity of contract for
a party to have standing or have stated the CISG is silent as to
privity, every proposal is a way to subvert this alleged, nonexistent
requirement or silence, as opposed to the solution advanced
herein: a logical, textual interpretation of the CISG to expressly
allow downstream purchasers' claims against upstream sellers.
The most frequently advanced propositions for avoiding this
presumed strict privity requirement, thus undermining the
legitimacy and goals of the CISG, have focused on principles of
domestic law authorizing action by non-privity parties and Article
16 of the CISG.5 4
Professors Ingeborg Schwenzer and Mareike Schmidt authored
the most significant article addressing the problem of strict privity
within the CISG, in which they rapidly advance the theory that the
CISG is silent on privity." Next, they posit and analyze
international chains of contract and detail national concepts
allowing claims by parties lacking privity of contract.56 In so
doing, the authors give particular detail to the law governing
admissibility of different categories of claims and the scope that
should be given to a manufacturer's liability when faced with a
particular category of non-privity claims." Professors Schwenzer
and Schmidt identify domestic (1) "claims arising out of an
assignment or an assumption of debts";5 1 (2) "[m]anufacturers'
guarantees or express warranties"; 59 and (3) "claims based on an
action directe,o implied warrant[ies] or ... contract[s] with
52 See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
53 See, e.g., Smythe, supra note 9 (suggesting that courts should "construe the
CISG to preempt all domestic contract claims and find a way of allowing downstream
buyers to make claims against remote sellers under the CISG itself').
54 See id. at 143-49.
55 See Schwenzer & Schmidt, supra note 3, at 113-18.
56 See id
57 See id at 118-21.
58 Id. at 122.
59 Id.
60 See Thermo King v. Cigna Ins. Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court for
Judicial Matters], Oct. 21, 1999, No. 96-19.992 (Fr.), available at http://cisgw3.law
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protective effects." 6' These national concepts, they suggest,
provide ways for a non-privity party to state a claim in an action to
which the CISG otherwise applies. 62 Again, Professors Schwenzer
and Schmidt only find ways to skirt a presumed problem, instead
of attacking the problem head-on by relying on the express
language of the CISG. These suggestions, while certainly explicit,
thoughtful, and provoking, epitomize the nature of the problem:
there are too many national responses and remedies to a problem
with a simple, logical, and textual solution already available
within the CISG.63
B. Caterpillar v. Usinor: A Study In National Law
Subversion64
The United States Northern District of Illinois case of
Caterpillar v. Usinor" perfectly highlights the confusion and
insufficient national law approaches discussed above 66 and serves
as evidence that national courts have completely undermined the
CISG's application, goals, and purposes. In Caterpillar,
Caterpillar and its Mexican subsidiary, Caterpillar Mexico
(CMSA), contracted with a French steel company, Usinor
Industeel (Usinor), and its U.S. subsidiary, Usinor Industeel, USA,
for the delivery of a specific quality of steel so that CMSA could
build truck bodies, which Caterpillar could then sell to
.pace.edu/cases/990105fl. html.
61 See Schwenzer & Schmidt, supra note 3, at 122.
62 See id. at 110.
63 In fact, as Professors Schwenzer and Schmidt acknowledge, their article is
strikingly similar to the hypothetical provided in the 16th Annual Willem C. Vis
International Moot Court Competition held in 2008-2009. Id. at 109 n.3. In the
problem, a commercial retailer received damaged cars and sought to sue the international
manufacturer rather than the intermediate importer, which had become insolvent and had
not directly caused the subject manufacturing defect. Id. The moot, which one of the
authors of this Article participated in and argued, showcased the alleged lack of a direct
action-only one team even advanced the direct action premise-and corresponding
plethora of national law remedies (for example, apparent authority, intended beneficiary
status, ratification, and many others).
64 This Article, for purposes of concision and ease of reading, provides a very
simplified recitation and examination of Caterpillar, and does not purport in any way to
address all parties and issues set forth in that decision.
65 Caterpillar, Inc. v. Usinor Industeel, 393 F. Supp. 2d 659 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
66 See supra Part III.A.
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customers." The party actually purchasing the steel from Usinor,
and thus in direct privity of contract, was CMSA. 8 Usinor
represented to Caterpillar and CMSA that the steel was of a certain
quality.69 Relying on those representations, Caterpillar contracted
with customers to sell them specific trucks and contracted with
CMSA to build such trucks. CMSA contracted with Usinor to
provide the steel for the trucks.7 ' The quality of steel supplied by
Usinor was subpar and resulted in the delivery of defective truck
bodies to Caterpillar's customers; the steel ultimately cracked and
made the trucks inoperable.72 Ultimately, both Caterpillar and
CMSA filed suit against Usinor under the CISG and the UCC, as
adopted in Illinois.73
Usinor asserted two primary defenses to the actions under the
CISG and the UCC: first, that all of Caterpillar's and CMSA's
UCC claims were preempted by the CISG; and second, that
Caterpillar did not have standing to bring any claim under the
CISG, citing the seller language in CISG Article 4.74 The
Caterpillar court held that the CISG's seller language prevented
Caterpillar from having standing to bring a claim against Usinor
under the CISG, and since Caterpillar did not have standing under
the CISG, its state law claims were not preempted.
Unfortunately for Caterpillar, the UCC as adopted in Illinois
requires privity of contract in order to seek money damages in
breach of warranty claims. 76 Caterpillar attempted to argue ways
up, around, over, and under this privity requirement to no avail.n
Caterpillar was therefore left with only a promissory estoppel
claim and CMSA was left with only CISG claims.
67 Caterpillar, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 663.
68 Id. at 677.
69 Id. at 665.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 665-66.
72 See id at 666-67.
73 Caterpillar, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 663.
74 Id at 672-74.
75 Id. at 675-76.
76 See id. at 677-78.
77 Id. at 678-79.
78 Id. at 681-82.
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The court in Caterpillar not only failed to provide the proper
precedential value to a treaty entered into by the United States but
also passed over the standing issue with such inattention that the
court's desire to simply avoid applying the CISG in favor of
domestic law was palpable.79 Indeed, in an action where
substantial international business interests were at stake, and the
CISG's interest in promoting uniformity in international
commercial sales transactions was definitely in play, the
Caterpillar court provided a very strict interpretation of the
CISG's seller language with minimal citation or analysis." This
decision reinforces the premise advanced by this Article that the
interpretation of the CISG's seller language often provided by
scholars, commentators, and courts ignores the express purposes
and goals of the CISG and weakens the CISG such that it is often
rendered useless. Nevertheless, a logical textual interpretation
exists that promotes and advances those very purposes and goals.
C. Subversion Through the CISG
On the other hand, some scholars decide to tackle the
nonexistent privity requirement through the CISG itself, and take
the position that Articles 14(2) and 16(2)(b) of the CISG are the
most appropriate vehicles to provide relief from strict privity.'
Article 14(2) provides that "[a] proposal other than one addressed
to one or more specific persons is to be considered merely as an
invitation to make offers, unless the contrary is clearly indicated
by the person making the proposal."8 2 Thus, under the CISG, one
may make an offer, at least in some situations, to unnamed persons
or entities. Article 16(2) provides that "an offer cannot be
revoked ... if it was reasonable for the offeree to rely on the offer
as being irrevocable and the offeree has acted in reliance on the
offer."83 This provision reflects the doctrine of promissory
estoppel, sans any requirement of foreseeability or detriment.84 In
79 See Smythe, supra note 9, at 136.
80 See Caterpillar, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 674-75.
81 See, e.g., Smythe, supra note 9, at 145-46 ("Articles 14(2) and 16(2)(b) of the
CISG offer an alternative approach to the privity problem that may therefore be even
more appealing and might also prove to be more flexible in application.").
82 CISG, supra note 1, art. 14, 2 (emphasis added).
83 Id. art. 16,12.
84 See Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 236, 286-88
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another article addressing the problems presented by the CISG's
presumed requirement of strict privity or its presumed silence
regarding the same, the author proposed that Article 16 of the
CISG is the most suitable way to reach a CISG that is, in effect,
not so limited by the constraints imposed by a strict privity
requirement." The author's theory is quite simple: CISG "Article
14(2) provides that offers may be made to indefinite persons," and
therefore Article 16(2)(b)'s more liberal version of promissory
estoppel might come into play to provide a basis for holding
upstream sellers accountable for claims made to unknown
downstream buyers from representations made in distribution,
promotion, and marketing of goods.8 6 This theory, while novel
and interesting, still finds a solution to a presumed problem by
stretching the language and application of the CISG instead of
interpreting the express language of the CISG and eliminating the
problem at its core through an ideal interpretation of Article 4's
seller language.
Indeed, the CISG's international character, the requirement to
promote uniformity in its application, and the observance of good
faith in international trade are not achieved through presuming
silence on privity and finding national ways for non-privity parties
to bring claims; nor are these interests advanced by presuming
silence on privity and using Article 16 as a way for a non-privity
party to assert a backdoor claim under the CISG. The strongest
way to tackle the problem is through the overlooked textual
response advanced herein-that Article 4's seller language is
simply not as restrictive as courts, scholars, and commentators
advance. Taken in light of the CISG's express language and
interpretive article, as well as the underlying goals advanced
through uniform international application of the CISG, courts
should construe Article 4's seller language so as to expressly
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Henry Mather, Firm Offers Under the UCC and the CISG, 105
DICK. L. REV. 31, 48 (2000) ("Paragraph (2)(b) looks very much like American
promissory estoppel doctrines, although it does not expressly require that the offeree's
reliance must have been foreseeable to the offeror and does not expressly require that the
offeree's reliance be detrimental.").
85 Smythe, supra note 9, at 129 ("The CISG can be construed to allow downstream
buyers to make claims against remote sellers under Article 16(2)(b), a provision that is
similar to the common law doctrine of promissory estoppel.").
86 Id. at 145-48.
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allow claims by non-privity parties.
IV. A Textual Response
This Article defines and interprets Article 4's use of seller, and
in such an analysis, the starting point must be the text." Seller is
not expressly defined in the text, but a common-sense definition-
examining standard definitions of both buyer and seller-does not
support excluding upstream sellers. Further, by utilizing a CISG-
based definition, through the commands of the CISG interpretive
article, Article 7, upstream sellers are included and subject to suit.
A. Standard Definitions OfBuyer And Seller Do Not Exclude
Upstream Sellers
The CISG does not expressly define the terms buyer and
seller." Though courts and scholars frequently use the terms
immediate buyer and immediate seller when discussing the
CISG,89 they are nowhere to be found within the text itself. This
often-applied misnomer has created the misguided perception of a
requirement, though clearly one is not in the text.
The term seller means nothing more than "one that offers for
sale,""o or "[a] person who sells or contracts to sell goods."9 ' The
term buyer merely means "purchaser," which means "one that
acquires property for a consideration,"92 or "[o]ne who makes a
purchase."" Thus, the CISG text and these standard definitions of
"buyer" and "seller" do not expressly limit every transaction to
one buyer and one seller. It is through interpretations of scholars,
national courts, and arbitral panels (likely as a result of engrained
domestic law notions of privity) that the word "immediate"-and
87 See Schwenzer & Schmidt, supra note 3, at 113 ("[P]t is first necessary to
consider whether the CISG deals with the question of the admissibility of contractual
claims without privity of contract.").
88 See Smythe, supra note 9, at 143.
89 See, e.g., Smythe, supra note 9, at 137 n.25.
90 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 2062 (1993)
[hereinafter WEBSTER'S].
91 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 1483 (citing U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(d)
(1999)).
92 WEBSTER'S, supra note 90, at 306, 1845.
93 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 228; see also id. at 1355 ("One
who obtains property for money or other valuable consideration; a buyer.").
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the idea that there can be only one buyer and one seller-has been
implanted into the CISG.9 4 Additionally, the reality of the modem
international sales transaction-a multi-partied transaction that is
large and complex 95-does not support the idea of a single-buyer-
single-seller transaction.
Therefore, a common-sense, standard definition neither caters
to any antiquated privity doctrine nor excludes the idea of more
than one entity fitting the seller role. Simply, the CISG does not
limit the possibility that seller includes upstream sellers. Further,
including upstream sellers comports with the interpretational
requirements of Article 7(1) and 7(2).
B. Article 7(1) Demands This Interpretation
When interpreting the text of the CISG, Article 7(1) requires
an acknowledgment of the CISG's international character, the
need to promote uniformity in the CISG's application, and the
observance of good faith.96 This interpretive requirement and
Article 7(2)'s gap-filling provisions counsel in favor of broader
CISG application, with less reliance on national standards and
law.97 A strictly textual approach to the definition of the word
seller-a somehow overlooked concept and idea-comports with
these principles and should be the welcomed route through the
increasingly weak, underutilized, and unnecessary privity
requirement (and its attendant loopholes, exceptions, and
exclusions) .
Interpreting the word seller in Article 4 to include upstream
sellers promotes the uniformity of the CISG and adds to its
international character. This interpretation removes the
unnecessary use of multiple, convoluted avenues, which all
accomplish the same goal, in favor of a standard, easy-to-apply
94 See, e.g., Speidel, supra note 3, at 173 ("CISG is limited to two-party
commercial contracts for sale . . . .").
95 See Schwenzer & Schmidt, supra note 3, at 108-09 (discussing the realities of
modern international sales); Smythe, supra note 9, at 124.
96 CISG, supra note 1, art. 7, I ("In the interpretation of this Convention, regard
is to be had to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its
application and the observance of good faith in international trade.").
97 See Smythe, supra note 9, at 133-34.
98 See supra Part II (discussing the erosion of privity); supra Part III (discussing
avenues up, around, over, and under privity).
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approach. A similar approach in the consumer sales arena
provides an excellent example." Additionally, this interpretation
promotes good faith and would not create or expand current
liability.'00
1. This Approach Adds to the CISG's International
Character and Promotes Uniformity
a. The Consumer Arena as an Example
Affording a direct action against an upstream seller is not
something new or novel, and there has been a recognized shift
internationally to utilize this approach"o'-especially in the
consumer arena. The CISG does not deal with consumer
transactions because consumers were already protected and
covered under national sales laws, and for the most part,
consumers were not engaged in international transactions.'0 2 The
shift affording a direct action for consumers came about as a result
of multiple, convoluted avenues being scrapped for a better, more
efficient and straight-forward approach."'
Importantly, for purposes of this Article, this direct approach
can be seen in the international commercial arena as well. The
United States, for example, has utilized this approach in its
commercial law-streamlining the process by affording
commercial entities a direct action.10 4 Moreover, the Scottish Law
Commission has decided to promote this streamlined approach for
smaller commercial entities, affording them a direct action, as
well.'os And, as Professors Schwenzer and Schmidt note, "As with
99 See infra Part IV.B.1.
100 See id.
101 HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW, supra note 5, at 65 (citing Millard H. Ruud,
Manufacturers' Liability for Representations Made by Their Sales Engineers to
Subpurchasers, 8 UCLA L. REv. 251, 255 (1961)).
102 See infra Part IV.B.3.
103 See supra Part 111.
104 See supra Part II (discussing the U.S. U.C.C.).
105 See Unfair Terms in Contracts: A Joint Consultation Paper, Scottish Law
Commission Discussion Paper No. 119, Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 166
(Aug. 2002), available at www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/download-file/view/121/; see also
supra Part II. (discussing fairness and the policy of protecting parties within the
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manufacturers' guarantees and express warranties, the scope of
application of these theories is not confined to consumers." 0 6
b. Applying the Consumer Arena Approach to the
CISG Requirements of Uniformity and
International Character
Multiple national law approaches confound the explicit
interpretive requirements of uniformity and international
character.'o With hundreds of ways up, around, over, and under'o
the privity barrier, it is time to streamline and create uniformity.
Scholars do not doubt the use of various national legal remedies to
secure judgment against upstream sellers;'09 they dispute which
remedies are effective means to impose liability, and when and
how those remedies are applied."' However, these disputes
generally lead to the same result-a uniform, international result
whereby upstream sellers can (and should) be sued, and through
which upstream sellers can (and should) be liable for their portion
of harm ultimately caused to a downstream buyer."'
Using seventy-eight" 2 national law regimes as a means to
accomplish the same result subverts internationalism and
uniformity. It dilutes the international spirit of the CISG to focus
unnecessarily on the national law of so many countries and it
undermines uniformity to constantly question (and provide
varying answers): seller's law, buyer's law, which seller or buyer,
law of potential debtor's country, law of initial contract, law of
distribution chain as reasons for the recommendation to allow a direct action).
106 Schwenzer & Schmidt, supra note 3, at 111.
107 See Smythe, supra note 9, at 131-32 ("[E]xcessive recourse to domestic law in
the face of apparent gaps in the CISG only frustrates the CISG's purpose of promoting
uniformity and encourages forum shopping.").
108 See supra Part III (discussing the methods up, around, over, and under the CISG
language).
109 See generally Schwenzer & Schmidt, supra note 3 (devoting an entire article to
various national avenues to liability).
110 See id. at 111-13 (discussing the propriety of various avenues around direct
liability).
IIl See, e.g., id at 118-21 (determining that, generally speaking, upstream sellers
will be ultimately liable); Smythe, supra note 9, at 136-37.
112 As of October 11, 2012, seventy-eight countries are a part of the CISG. See
UNCITRAL Status, supra note 44.
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final contract, lexfori, and more. 113
2. The Correct Definition is a Good Faith Interpretation
While there is no explicit duty of good faith conduct within the
CISG, there is a requirement to interpret the CISG in good faith.114
An interpretation which holds upstream sellers liable for the
wrongs they cause advances good faith; one that allows upstream
sellers to subvert or shirk liability, or one that unnecessarily
expends more judicial and arbitral resources, does not. Therefore,
the current misinterpretation of seller does not comport with the
explicit good faith interpretation requirement.
Where one party causes harm, that party should be held
responsible. It defies good faith and logic to assert otherwise.
Indeed, universally, laws seek to hold responsible parties liable for
their actions. Therefore, courts and arbitral panels should interpret
the CISG to ensure this fundamental goal of compensation."'
Why, then, does an international convention-explicitly
interpreted through a good faith lensl"6 -currently enhance the
ability for those liable to avoid responsibility? It is only
reasonable, and in good faith, to implement the simplest, most
efficient means by which to accomplish this goal of compensation:
include upstream sellers within the definition of seller.
Further, it defies good faith to allow an upstream seller to rely
on the convoluted structure and uncertain path to liability that the
current system creates.1 7  Indeed, such a reliance allows an
upstream seller to bet on the assumption that as a result of such
convolution and uncertainty, a party with a legitimate claim will
113 See Schwenzer & Schmidt, supra note 3, at 115-17 (discussing potential
problems and questions regarding which law applies).
114 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 7, $1 ("In the interpretation of this Convention,
regard is to be had to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in
its application and the observance of good faith in international trade.").
115 See CISG-AC Opinion No. 6, Calculation of Damages Under CISG Article 74,
Rapporteur: Professor John Y. Gotanda, Villanova University School of Law, Villanova,
Pennsylvania, USA [hereinafter CISG-AC Op. 6], available at www.cisg.law.pace.edu/
cisg/CISG-AC-op6.html ("Article 74 reflects the general principle of full
compensation.").
116 See CISG, supra note 1, art.7, I ("In the interpretation of the Convention,
regard is to be had to . .. the observance of good faith in international trade.").
1H7 See Smythe, supra note 9, at 134-35 (discussing potential that domestic law
regimes would provide no recourse to aggrieved downstream buyers).
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refuse to proceed accordingly. With the tremendous uncertainty
created by the lack of a consistent, known, and fully enforceable'"
direct path of liability, this strategy may be a good bet for an
upstream seller. Unfortunately, it inhibits international trade." 9 It
fosters an environment of poor dealings, eluding responsibility,
and betting on the inability (or inefficiency) of actual suit.
Conversely, direct action would cultivate international trade
through avoiding uncertainty.12 0  Upstream sellers, knowing the
efficient path available to the ones they harm, will produce and
distribute better, safer, and more economical products. Further,
upstream sellers, knowing the added ease of award enforcement,
would do the same. Purchasers will be granted security in
knowing they can directly, efficiently, and reliably recover from
the responsible party; thus, they will purchase more.
Consequently, good faith in international trade wins.
3. The Idea that a Direct Path will Increase Current
Liability is Misplaced
As upstream sellers are already ultimately liable for faulty,
defective products or other problems they cause, 12 no new liability
will result. The CISG already protects sellers from unfettered
liability through a host of articles regarding causation, knowledge,
international, and commercial requirements.12 2  And parties to
CISG contracts are able to vary, or even exclude, the CISG's
118 While there is a convention covering international enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards, the same cannot be said for foreign judgments. See Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 7, 1959, 330 U.N.T.S.
38 [hereinafter N.Y. Cony.]. As is quite often the case in international sales contracts,
the parties opt for arbitration rather than suit in a national court-increasing the ease of
enforceability.
119 See generally Smythe, supra note 9, at 129 (finding that confounding the
general principles of the CISG will create disunity and undermine good faith in
international trade).
120 See generally JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW & ECONOMICS: CASES, MATERIALS &
BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVES (2002) (discussing, generally, the idea of transaction costs
and certainty).
121 See Schwenzer & Schmidt, supra note 3, at 115 ("The determining factor is that
the manufacturer's financial outcome remains the same; be it by way of recourse within
the respective contract relationships ultimately attributing the loss to the manufacturer or
by way of a direct claim."); see also supra Part II (discussing the erosion of privity).
122 See generally CISG, supra note I (containing articles on indicated topics).
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application in favor of other law if they so choose.123 With these
safeguards already in place, unfettered or unexpected liability will
not result.
The attendant causation requirements included in the CISG
ensure that only those sellers (upstream or not) that actually cause
resulting consequences are liable. 124  For example, Article 74
explicitly requires any loss be "a consequence of the breach." 25
Liability is further limited by the requirement that the seller knew
or should have known before liability attaches.12 6  Most
significantly, Article 25 requires that one foresee or should have
foreseen the result and detriment.127  Finally, Article 74 also
requires that one foresee or ought to have foreseen the loss at the
conclusion of the contract before damages can be awarded.128
The CISG is also limited to international, commercial sales
transactions.129 These limitations further restrict liability under the
CISG, as the CISG only governs those sellers and buyers with an
international, commercial relationship. 3 0 These two axiomatic
principles of the CISG curtail unlimited liability. Excluding
consumers and intra-national sales transactions ensures that only
international merchants-whether upstream or not-are
responsible for conforming their conduct to CISG standards and
guidelines.
Finally, the CISG is essentially permissive.' 3 ' The CISG
123 See id art. 6.
124 See, e.g., id. art. 57, I (limiting all sellers' responsibility for increases in costs
related to moving locations to situations where seller causes the move to occur); id. art.
80 (limiting all sellers' right to recover when seller causes the other's failure to perform).
125 Id. art. 74 (emphasis added).
126 See, e.g., id. art. 2 (requiring that all sellers know or should have known the
goods were not for personal or household use); id. art. 8, I (requiring that the other
party know or should have known the subjective intent of a party before it can be used to
interpret conduct and actions); id. art. 9, 2 (restricting international trade usages to
those the parties knew or should have known about); id. art. 35, 2(b) (requiring that all
sellers know or should have known of the buyer's specific purpose for the goods); id. art.
68 (requiring that all sellers know or should have known the goods were damaged before
liability attaches).
127 See id. art. 25.
128 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 74.
129 See id art. I (mandating the parties be from different contracting states).
130 See id.
131 See id. art. 6 (allowing parties to exclude application of the agreement).
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counsels all sellers and buyers that governance under the CISG
may be excluded entirely or modified by agreement. 3 2 Moreover,
the text repeatedly advises that "unless otherwise agreed," the
CISG provisions apply as written. 133 This leaves the ultimate
choices of when, how, and to what extent upstream sellers may
incur liability completely within the hands of sophisticated,
international merchants.13 4
Consequently, liability safeguards are already in place. This
direct path interpretation will not increase the potential for liability
and leaves ultimate responsibility where it should be. The
combination of causation, internationalism, knowledge, and party
autonomy ensures that those international, commercial sellers,
whom are ultimately responsible and contract for liability,
maintain it. Further, this combination ensures that unlimited or
expanded liability does not occur.
Accordingly, the definition of the term seller does not exclude
upstream sellers. The CISG's international character and
principles of uniformity and good faith favor an interpretation that
includes these entities. As protections exist within the CISG
framework to ensure that unfettered, unlimited liability does not
result,135 upstream sellers can be, and are, included within the term
seller.
C. Article 7(2) Demands This Textual Interpretation
"Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention
which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity
with the general principles on which it is based . . . .,,136 Courts
132 See id.
133 See, e.g., id. art. 9, 2 (permitting parties to agree that specific trade usages will
not apply); id. art. 35, 1 2 (permitting parties to agree that a good will meet an ordinary
or particular purpose).
134 See also Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Jan. 9, 2002,
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1651, 2002 (Ger.), translated in Federal
Supreme Court (Bundesgericht), Civil Panel, VIII, CISG Case Presentation (William M.
Baron & Burgit Kurtz eds., Alston & Bird LLP trans., 2002), [hereinafter The Powdered
Milk Case], avaliable at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cases/020109gl.html (discussing
the obligation of parties to contract for, and around, certain liabilities); Schwenzer &
Schmidt, supra note 3, at 119 n.50 (highlighting contract clause utilized to limit liability
and define the extent of the CISG's application).
135 See Schwenzer & Schmidt, supra note 3, at 119 n.50.
136 CISG, supra note 1, art. 7, 1 2. It is only after one gets through article 7, 1 and
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and arbitral panels should read the text of the CISG to define seller
as all sellers through Article 7(1). The question of who is a seller
is necessarily governed by the CISG, and is settled through
interpretation by Article 7(1).137 However, even assuming
arguendo that seller cannot be interpreted that way, the CISG-at
a minimum-governs this issue, but it may be silent as to its
resolution.'38 If so, Article 7(2) must be utilized and the general
principles on which the CISG is based must be addressed. These
general principles only bolster the conclusion that direct action
and upstream sellers are part of the CISG regime.
1. The CISG Governs Who is a Seller
The CISG, explicitly through Article 4, governs sales
transactions in an international context and the attendant rights and
obligations of buyer and seller thereunder.'39 By explicitly
governing the rights of the undefined buyer and seller the CISG at
least governs the issue of who is a buyer or seller. While there are
those who disagree,14 0 the CISG at least governs the rights and
obligations of those considered buyer and seller.14' Thus, the
question of whether seller includes upstream seller is certainly
governed, but may not be expressly settled, by the CISG.
Therefore, the first part of Article 7(2)-general principles on
this part of article 7, 2 that one can begin addressing application of national sales law.
See id. ("[O]r, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by
virtue of the rules of private international law."). Professor Smythe aptly counsels,
"excessive recourse to domestic law in the face of apparent gaps in the CISG only
frustrates the CISG's purpose of promoting uniformity and encourages forum shopping."
Smythe, supra note 9, at 131-32.
137 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 7, 1 (requiring that regard be given to the
international nature of the agreement and recognizing the need for uniformity and the
observance of good faith in its application).
138 Schwenzer & Schmidt, supra note 3, at 114 ("The CISG itself is silent on the
admissibility of direct contractual claims by non-privity parties.").
139 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 4.
140 See Schwenzer & Schmidt, supra note 3, at 114-15 ("Certainly, no positive
answer concerning the general question of admissibility of a contractual claim without
privity can be derived from the CISG. ... [But], this question is entirely outside the
scope of the Convention."). But see id at 114 ("The CISG itself is silent on the
admissibility of direct contractual claims by non-privity parties.").
141 See Smythe, supra note 9, at 131 (explaining that construing "whether a buyer
under a CISG may have rights against a third party, such as a remote seller, as a matter
not addressed by the CISG" is "a dubious construction of the CISG at best").
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which the CISG is based-must be considered.
2. The General Principles on Which the CISG is
Based Support Including Upstream Sellers
The "general principles on which [the CISG] is based"'4 2 is an
open concept that scholars often debate. However, the ideas of
international character, uniformity, and good faith (from Article
7(1)) are generally accepted principles.'4 3 In addition, appropriate
parties bearing the risk of loss,1' "full compensation,"l4 5 parties
working out differences before going to court,'4 6 and freedom of
contract and party autonomy 4 7 are also general principles on
which the CISG is based.
a. Uniformity, International Character, and Good
Faith
As discussed above'48 an interpretation which holds upstream
sellers liable for the wrongs they cause advances good faith, while
the current interpretation, which allows upstream manufacturers to
subvert or shirk liability and to strain judicial economy, does not
advance good faith. Expanded liability is not a consideration
against this good faith principle, as safeguards against unlimited,
142 CISG, supra note 1, art. 7, T 2.
143 JOSEPH F. MORRISSEY & JACK M. GRAVES, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW AND
ARBITRATION 57 (2008); CISG-AC Op. 6, supra note 115.
144 See, e.g., CISG, supra note 1, art. 18, 2 (placing the risk of loss of
international mail acceptances with the buyer-the party better able to bear any
confusion of the international mails); id art. 40 (removing the two-year time limit on
claims where the seller knew of an existing problem); id. art. 67 (mandating that risk of
loss only pass when the seller, who has the goods or was in last possession of them,
notifies the seller or clearly identifies the goods); id. art. 68 (placing risk of loss during
in-transit contracts on the seller-the party better able to guard against any loss prior to
contracting); id. art. 69, 1 (allocating risk of loss to seller, until delay becomes a
breach, because the goods remain with seller at seller's location).
145 CISG-AC Op. 6, supra note 115 ("Article 74 reflects the general principle of
full compensation."); see also CISG, supra note 1, art. 74 (applying a broad definition of
recoverable damages).
146 See generally MORRISSEY & GRAVES, supra note 143, at 57 (citing notice and
cure provisions under articles 19, 21, 39, 47, 48, and more).
'47 Id.
148 See supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing good faith in interpretation under article 7(1)).
2013 721
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
unfettered, new liability currently exist.'49 Good faith requires that
where a party causes harm, that party is held responsible.' Good
faith provides the simplest, most efficient, enforceable"' means by
which to accomplish this: including upstream sellers within the
definition of seller. Further, the principles of international
character and uniformity counsel in favor of this interpretation.'15 2
With the multitude of ways up, around, over, and under the privity
barrier,'53 this interpretation streamlines the process and provides a
uniform result of liability for harms through one regime;'5 4 rather
than the inconsistent, non-uniform, piece-meal structure that
currently focuses on the national law of seventy-eight different
countries to achieve the same result."' Therefore, to the extent
that there is a gap and an Article 7(2) analysis is necessary, this
interpretation aligns with the general principles of good faith,
international character, and uniformity.
b. Appropriate Parties Bearing the Risk ofLoss
The CISG drafters discussed the issue of which party is in a
better position to bear the risk of loss.'"' By using risk of loss as a
lens to determine the correct rule, application, or interpretation, the
CISG strikes an appropriate balance of who is ultimately
responsible, and it places the risks and rewards of contracting with
the appropriate party.'' The textual approach to include upstream
sellers furthers this interest.
149 See supra Part IV.B.3 (discussing the myth of expanded liability).
150 See supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing good faith in interpretation under article 7(1)).
151 While there is a convention covering international enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards, the same cannot be said for foreign judgments. See N.Y. Conv., supra
note 118. And, as is quite often the case in international sales contracts, the parties opt
for arbitration rather than suit in a national court-increasing the ease of enforceability.
152 See supra Part IV.B.1 (discussing internationalism and uniformity sections).
153 See supra Part II (detailing the erosion of privity); supra Part III (detailing the
various avenues to maneuver up, around, over, and under the CISG).
154 But see generally Schwenzer & Schmidt, supra note 3 (devoting an entire article
to subversion of a direct route).
155 See UNCITRAL Status, supra note 44.
156 See, e.g., Peter Schlechtriem, Uniform Sales Law in the Decisions of the
Bundesgerichtshof (Todd Fox trans., 2001), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edulcisg/biblio/
schlechtriem3.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2013).
157 See id.
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This balance can be seen throughout the CISG.'" The CISG
drafters chose not to adopt the common law mailbox rule, as
international mail systems would likely be less known and reliable
than their national counterparts; therefore, it would be appropriate
to make acceptances valid upon receipt, not posting. 5 9
Additionally, the CISG drafters recognized this idea in Article
79(1) and (2)-holding sellers responsible for those within their
own supply chain, absent exceptional circumstances. 16 And, as a
final example, the CISG includes numerous notice requirements
and exemptions based on which party knew what and when.'6 1
Including upstream sellers furthers this balance. First, an
upstream seller is better able to bear and distribute the risk of loss
than the buyer.16 2  Second, a sophisticated, international seller
(upstream or otherwise) is in a better position to know its own
downstream market and distribution scheme than a purchaser. The
upstream seller, therefore, has the ability to create, control, and
monitor the situation; it is thus in the better position to control and
bear any risk of loss. The purchaser did not create the distribution
scheme and has little, if any, control over how the good ultimately
gets to it. Finally, the CISG places more obligations on the
158 See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
159 See id art. 18(2); see also Guide to CISG Article 18, Secretariat Commentary,
Albert H. Kritzer CISG Database, PACE INST. INT'L CoM. L., http://www.cisg.law.pace.
edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-18.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2013).
160 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 79(l)-(2); see also CISG Advisory Council Opinion
No. 7, Exemption of Liability for Damages under Article 79 of the CISG (adopted Oct.
12, 2007), available at http://www.cisgac.com/default.php?ipkCat-128&ifkCat=
148&sid=169; Peter Schlectriem, FED. SUP. CT. (BUNDESGERICHTSHOF), CIV. PANEL VII,
No. VIII ZR 121/98 (Todd Fox & Sonja Corterier trans., 1999), available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/990324gl.html#cc (emphasizing that if a seller "cannot
bear [the risk of loss of his suppliers], or does not want to, he must contractually limit it
or exclude it"); Schwenzer & Schmidt, supra note 3, at 119 n.50.
161 See, e.g., CISG, supra note 1, art. 20 (requiring notice for avoidance, ensuring
that the party who seeks to avoid a contract notifies the other); id. art. 39 (requiring that
the buyer, who now has the goods and is in the best position to determine if there is a
problem, provide notice of those problems to the seller); id. art. 40 (removing the two-
year time limit on claims where the seller knew of an existing problem); id art. 67
(mandating that risk of loss only pass when the seller, who has the goods or was in last
possession of them, notifies the seller or clearly identifies the goods).
162 Manufacturers Liability, supra note 34, at 539 (citing Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring)).
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seller,163 which is understandable given the seller is the party that
ultimately controls the good and can control the risk associated
with that good. Therefore, to the extent there is a gap, and an
Article 7(2) analysis is necessary, this interpretation aligns with
the general principle risk of loss allocation. Continuing this
principle by including upstream sellers comports with the risk of
loss allocations provided for in the CISG.
c. Full Compensation
The CISG expresses the principle of full compensation,'6 4 and
Article 74 embodies that principle by allowing for a broad
damages calculation.165 In addition, the remedies afforded under
the CISG are cumulative,16 6 thus ensuring full compensation. This
principle of full compensation is upheld by an interpretation which
grants buyers a remedy under the CISG when an upstream seller is
the cause of damages. However, the principle is confounded when
an aggrieved buyer must suffer the uncertainty, potential
unenforceability, and maze of national laws 67  to hold a
responsible upstream seller liable for damages. The principle of
full compensation is also not furthered when buyers are left
without efficient, certain recourse to hold the responsible party
liable. Therefore, to the extent there is a gap and an Article 7(2)
163 Compare CISG, supra note 1, arts. 30-44 (covering the seller's obligations, such
as the manufacture, production or distribution of the good, delivery or handing over, and
conformity), with CISG, supra note 1, arts. 53-60 (covering the two obligations of the
buyer: to pay and take delivery).
164 CISG-AC Opinion No. 6, supra note 115 ("Article 74 reflects the general
principle of full compensation.").
165 CISG, supra note 1, art. 74 (mandating that damages "consist of a sum equal to
the loss, including loss of profit, suffered by the other party as a consequence of the
breach").
166 See id art. 45(2) (preserving buyer's right to damages even if buyer exercises
other remedies); id. art. 61(2) (preserving seller's right to damages even if seller
exercises other remedies); see also CISG-AC Opinion No. 6, supra note 115, cmt. 1
("Article 74 reflects the general principle of full compensation."); CISG Advisory
Council Opinion No. 8, Calculation of Damages Under CISG Articles 75 and 76,
Rapporteur: Professor John Y. Gotanda, Villanova University School of Law, Villanova,
Pennsylvania, USA (adopted Nov. 15, 2008), available at http://www.cisgac.com/
default.php?ipkCat-128&ifkCat-148&sid=184 (explaining that the remedies afforded
under Articles 75 and 76 are cumulative).
167 See Schwenzer & Schmidt, supra note 3, at 115-17 (describing the complexities
of determining what national law applies).
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analysis is necessary, this interpretation aligns with the general
principle of full compensation, ensuring that buyers fully recover
for any losses.
d. Preserving Contracts and Using Litigation and
Arbitration as a Last Resort
The general principle of preserving contracts-that is, using
courts and arbitral panels as a last resort and urging parties to work
out issues on their own--can be seen throughout the CISG.
This idea is especially important given the current economic
situation. All parties must be cognizant of transaction, litigation,
and arbitration costs, while seeking the most efficient, economical
ways to handle issues that arise under international sales contracts.
The CISG recognizes this need through the plethora of notice 69
and cure provisions.' The general principle of preserving
contracts and resources is furthered by the high burden of
fundamental breach before avoidance.' 7 ' Thus, the CISG supports
the goal of efficiency and the doctrine pacta sunt servanda (i.e.,
agreements must be kept).'72
Under current CISG interpretations, a buyer may sue its direct
seller, which may then sue its direct seller, which may then sue its
direct seller .. . to continue ad nauseam.'73  Yet, the end result
remains the same; the ultimately responsible party still bears the
final burden. But, the time, effort, and expense to reach this end
increases with each step in the process. And, there is always the
potential that a kink in this litigation or arbitration chain could
prevent suit all the way to the liable upstream seller.'74 As
168 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
169 See, e.g., CISG, supra note 1, art. 26 (requiring notice to avoid a contract); id.
art. 39 (requiring buyer to notify seller of lack of conformity); id. art. 71(3) (requiring a
party seeking to suspend performance and give notice "immediately").
170 See, e.g., id. art. 37 (allowing seller to cure if it has delivered before the delivery
date); id art. 48 (allowing seller to cure even after the delivery date).
171 See generally id. art. 25 (mandating that a party be substantially deprived of
what it was entitled to expect before avoidance is possible).
172 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 957 (defining pacta sunt
servanda, which is Latin for "agreements must be kept," as "the rule that agreements and
stipulations, esp. those contained in treaties, must be observed").
173 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
174 See Smythe, supra note 9, at 137.
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litigation and arbitration of complex, international sales
transactions are already costly due to the inherent nature of an
international sales agreement, adding the costs of multiple
arbitrations or court dates to reach the same result is inefficient
and uneconomical.
Similarly, if the upstream sellers have indemnification
agreements, the multiplicity of suits and/or arbitrations continues
the time, effort, and costs for each seller and buyer. Or, where the
entities in the chain of arbitrations and/or suits are left with the
uncertainty of remedy, result, or enforceability under a variety of
legal regimes, efficiency is again decreased.'7 5 Therefore, as
Professor Schwenzer explains "the direct claim may be overall
more beneficial to the manufacturer because in this way fewer
transaction costs accrue."' 6
Finally, interpreting the CISG to allow a direct action increases
efficiency by way of judicial and arbitral economy. With courts
and tribunals already burdened with overcrowded dockets, adding
unnecessary cases hinders the ability for parties to be heard.
Therefore, this definition complies with the CISG principle of
using litigation as a last resort and keeping contracts alive, while
ensuring the most efficient and economical result if litigation or
arbitration is necessary. 7 7
e. Party Autonomy
Parties can, and do, contract around and for specific
limitations, rights, and responsibilities;'7 ' and, the CISG is based
on the general principles of party autonomy and choice.17 9  A
sophisticated, international seller or buyer (upstream or otherwise)
175 The idea of certainty is a transaction cost, which law and economic scholars
consider in determining the most efficient and economical result. See generally
HARRISON, supra note 120 (discussing, generally, the idea of transaction costs and
certainty).
176 Schwenzer & Schmidt, supra note 3, at 115.
177 See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
178 See, e.g., The Powdered Milk Case, supra note 134 (describing the contract for
sale of powdered milk).
179 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 6 (allowing parties to exclude application of the
CISG or modify its application); see also id. art. 9(2) (permitting parties to agree that
specific trade usages will not apply); id. art. 35(2) (permitting parties to agree a good
will meet an ordinary or particular purpose).
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has the responsibility to pay for the harm it causes; but, at the
same time, may contract for and around anything it does not
want. 80 In general, the CISG applies to arms-length transactions
between sophisticated business entities capable of discussing and
negotiating aspects of their relationship, including liability and
remedies.' 8 ' Therefore, there is nothing in including upstream
sellers that would detract from this general principle.
Accordingly, if one reaches the requirement of utilizing the
general principles of the CISG to form an interpretation, those
general principles counsel in favor of including upstream sellers.
This interpretation promotes the general principles of (i)
international character, uniformity, and good faith; (ii) appropriate
parties bearing the risk of loss; (iii) full compensation; (iv) party
autonomy; and (v) parties working out matters first before going to
court or arbitration.
V. Conclusion
The regime governing international sales contracts provided
for by the CISG does not cater to privity: "an obsolete vestige of
the pre-modern world that undermines economic efficiency and
sound business ethics." 8 2  Rather, the CISG should include
upstream sellers within Article 4's seller language. The current
text provides for this definition and interpretation.' 83 The national
doctrine of privity has been eroded away,14 and does not deserve
to remain in a modem, international sales convention, where the
text and interpretive requirements conflict with this ancient
doctrine.
As the CISG governs the relationship between buyer and
seller,' the question of who is a seller certainly arises. The term
80 See The Powdered Milk Case, supra note 134 (discussing the obligation of
parties to contract for, and around, certain liabilities); Schwenzer & Schmidt, supra note
3, at 119 n.50 (highlighting contract clause utilized to limit liability and define the extent
of the CISG's application).
181 See CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(1) (requiring international, merchant parties
involved in commercial trade); Smythe, supra note 9, at 138 n.62.
182 Smythe, supra note 9, at 143.
183 See supra Part IV (explaining how the CISG text supports including upstream
sellers).
184 See supra Part 11.
185 CISG, supra note 1, art. 4.
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seller is not expressly defined, but Article 7(1)'s mandate to use
uniformity, the CISG's international character, and good faith to
make this interpretation counsels in favor of upstream sellers
being included. Adequate safeguards are in place to quell any
suggestion of increased or unfettered liability. Moreover,
assuming the CISG governs-but does not decide-the issue of
who is a seller, Article 7(2)'s mandate to utilize general principles
upon which the CISG is based also counsels in favor of this
interpretation. The general principles of international character,
uniformity, and good faith, as well as appropriate parties bearing
the risk of loss, full compensation, parties working out matters
first before going to court or arbitration, and party autonomy
support an interpretation which includes upstream sellers.
In sum, while many prefer to jump to the privity conclusion
and seek a national law remedy, an examination of the text does
not provide for this approach. An examination of the text, through
the lens of the CISG interpretive article, favors an interpretation
placing upstream sellers within Article 4's use of the term seller.
Simply-and textually-stated, there is no need to travel up,
around, over, or under the privity doctrine to achieve the same
liability. The text provides that upstream sellers are sellers within
Article 4 of the CISG.
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